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Near the beginning and end of his Lettres philosophiques (1734), his first major text promot-
ing the principles of enlightenment, Voltaire gave examples of two very different kinds of 
eloquence. In the third letter on the Quakers, he pictured George Fox converting his jailers 
with his inspired preaching. In the last letter, he praised the eloquence of Pascal before he 
attempted a refutation of the Pensées, calling Pascal’s projected apology for Christianity 
“un livre plein de paralogismes éloquents et de faussetés admirablement déduites” (XXII. 
28).1 Each is representative of a brand of eloquence Voltaire found objectionable. The first 
kind, appealing chiefly to the lower classes, thrives on enthusiasm—a contagious disease 
in Voltaire’s eyes; it breeds fanaticism, factions, and sects. Pascal’s eloquence, designed for 
a more sophisticated audience, makes use of formal argumentation and elegant style and 
is thus all the more insidious. 
Both demanded a philosophic antidote. As Voltaire increasingly devoted his energy to 
the battle for enlightenment, he turned more and more to the eloquence for which he had 
long been acclaimed in his plays and poetry. Much of this propaganda is found in works 
cast in the established rhetorical genres of the day. In discours and legal briefs he champi-
oned reform of the law codes and defended victims of judicial error like the Calas family: 
he used sermons and homilies to attack l’infâme, undermining the foundations of Christi-
anity while advocating deism and religious toleration. Depending on just how the bound-
aries of these genres are drawn, some forty to fifty works fit into this category. 
The rationale behind Voltaire’s decision to make eloquence an important instrument of 
his enlightened ideals has never been fully examined.2 One reason for this neglect is that 
extended discussions of rhetoric and eloquence are rare in his writings. The two longest 
texts are his 1755 article, “Eloquence,” for Diderot’s Encyclopédie, and the section on the 
Rhetoric of the article, “Aristote,” published in 1770 in the Questions sur l’Encyclopédie. These 
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texts, however, hardly exhaust his reflexions on the subject; there exist numerous refer-
ences to eloquence throughout his correspondence and other works. A good number of 
these are found in the articles on literature he prepared in 1754–1756 for the Encyclopédie, 
while others are briefer comments on some writer or piece of eloquence that interested him 
at the moment. Although they were written over his long career in various circumstances 
and with many different audiences in mind, a consistent pattern emerges from them. 
Voltaire’s lifelong respect for eloquence is noteworthy in light of the hostility shown it 
by the philosophical tradition after Descartes. Henri Gouhier has described the Cartesian 
position as a quest for “une philosophie sans rhétorique.”3 Descartes’ search for absolute 
certainty with self-evidence as the criterion for truth led him to scorn any merely probable 
truths, the realm of eloquence since Aristotle. He maintained that in order to persuade 
others, the rules of rhetoric are of little use; clear and intelligible thinking is enough. This 
critique of eloquence was developed more extensively by Malebranche and his followers. 
They reduced the art to the use of stylistic devices calculated to excite the imagination and 
passions. For them, rather than fostering calm deliberation of issues, eloquence leads to 
hasty judgments that are as often as not in error.4 
The influence of these views can be seen in two eighteenth-century attitudes that se-
verely limited the scope of eloquence. The first was a tendency to restrict the use of reason 
to philosophy, leaving eloquence only emotion. D’ Alembert’s pronouncements in the En-
cyclopédie and in the Académie française reflect this view. He defined eloquence as “le tal-
ent de faire passer avec rapidité et d’imprimer avec force dans l’âme des autres le 
sentiment profond dont on est pénétré.”5 Logic communicates ideas, while eloquence only 
communicates the deep conviction of the speaker. Yet to hold eloquence exclusively to the 
emotional mode of persuasion restricts its range and effectiveness. A truly enlightened 
eloquence would have to include a rational component as well. 
A related tendency was to define eloquence chiefly in terms of style and thus to link it 
to poetry. From this perspective, eloquence is the art of combining figures of speech and 
thought in a way that sets it apart from ordinary language. Such a close relationship be-
tween the two arts during the second phase of the Querelle des Anciens et des Modernes was 
noted by Margaret Gilman. Poetry was considered merely a more striking form of elo-
quence to which it added meter, rhyme, and perhaps bolder imagery.6 But just as an en-
lightened eloquence required that Voltaire emphasize the role of reason as well as the 
emotions, he would also have to distinguish between eloquence and poetry in a way that 
stressed the persuasive rather than the decorative qualities of the art. Thus, after briefly 
treating Voltaire’s relation to the past masters of eloquence, I will focus on these two prob-
lems. Since my subject is the rationale behind his practice, for the most part I will be exam-
ining his comments on the theory and criticism of eloquence. 
Voltaire was formally introduced to eloquence in the Jesuit college of Louis-le-Grand, 
where his two teachers during his year of rhetoric in 1709–1710, Fathers LeJay and Porée, 
were both knowledgeable and later published Latin texts on the subject.7 Nevertheless, 
Voltaire was critical of both the theoretical and practical aspects of training in rhetoric in 
the schools, attacking the reliance on classroom exercises based on amplification (XVII. 
184) and the memorization of rhetorical jargon. Amplification only trained the students to 
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become longwinded, he claimed, and the rules and precepts were a parody of true elo-
quence. “Que de puérilités pédantesques on entassait il n’y a pas longtemps dans la tête 
d’un jeune homme, pour lui donner en une année ou deux une très-fausse idée de l’élo-
quence, dont il aurait pu avoir une connaissance très-vraie en peu de mois, par la lecture 
de quelques bons livres” (VIII. 305). Thirty-five years after his formal schooling, Voltaire 
professed to have forgotten the rules of eloquence he had learned under the Jesuits (Best. 
D3348). In addition, his frequent use of such disparaging epithets as “déclamation de 
collège” (Best. D10469), “écolier de rhétorique” (Best. Dl8061), or “éloquence de collège” 
(Best. Dl4039) shows that scholastic eloquence, with its conscious devotion to the rules of 
formal rhetoric and pompous style, remained a negative model for him his whole life. 
We can only speculate about the identity of the “quelques bons livres” referred to above 
whose study would provide a faithful picture of eloquence in a few short months. Given 
Voltaire’s belief that the rules of rhetoric had not changed since the time of Cicero (XXV. 
457), and his frequent laments over the sad state of contemporary French eloquence, he 
probably preferred the ancient authorities. He held out Demosthenes and Cicero as model 
practitioners of eloquence. In much the same way that he used “régent de rhétorique” as a 
term of derision, he addressed writers as “Cicéron” in order to flatter and encourage them 
to greater heights of eloquence. 
Eighteenth-century critics of contemporary rhetorical training like D’Alembert usually 
stressed that eloquence was a talent acquired through exposure to the best models, rather 
than by the study of rules.8 Voltaire also pictured eloquence as a gift of nature, noting that 
the precepts of rhetoric were only codified after the art was born (XVIII. 514–515). Just the 
same, he showed a high regard for the classical theoreticians. Among them he had special 
praise for Aristotle, about whose Rhetoric he wrote, “Je ne crois pas qu’il y ait une seule 
finesse de l’art qui lui échappe” (XVII. 372). Voltaire also admired Cicero as a rhetorician 
as well as a speaker, all the while recognizing the Roman’s debt to Aristotle (XVIII. 516). 
The catalogue of Voltaire’s Ferney library lists Latin editions of Cicero and Quintilian’s 
rhetorical works.9 In addition, Voltaire praised the abbé Gédoin’s translations of the lnsti-
tutio Oratoria as well as François Cassandre’s French version of Aristotle’s Rhetoric (XIV. 
76; 49). Nevertheless, it is difficult to identify a specific debt to any writer on the basis of 
Voltaire’s comments, or even to determine how thorough his knowledge of them was. His 
tendency was to use the authority of the classical authors to buttress his own preferences. 
Thus, although he gave a brief outline in the article “Eloquence” of the topics treated in the 
Rhetoric, the specific passages Voltaire referred to in the articles on literature for the Ency-
clopédie are chiefly from Book III, where Aristotle’s recommendations about the use of ap-
propriate metaphors appealed to Voltaire’s sense of convenance (XVIII. 515; XIX. 10). In 1770 
Voltaire again made use of these passages, this time to attack prose poetry, one of his bêtes 
noires (XVII. 373). 
The attention Voltaire directed to Aristotle’s comments on metaphor shows the close 
link in his mind between style and eloquence. In fact, he once defined eloquence to Fred-
erick the Great in stylistic terms: “L’éloquence ne consiste t’elle pas a transporter les mots 
d’une espèce dans une autre, n’esce pas à elle d’animer tout”? (Best. D4001) On another 
occasion he assigned it a decorative function, calling it the “ornement de la vérité” (Best. 
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D 1660). But it becomes clear that Voltaire did not consider eloquence merely a matter of 
stylistic embellishment when we see how he distinguished poetry from eloquence. 
On the one hand, because Voltaire saw poetry and eloquence as related arts, he fre-
quently mentioned them in the same breath. Both are natural gifts which require a lifetime 
to perfect: “La connaissance aprofondie de la poésie et de l’éloquence demande toute la vie 
d’un homme” (Best. D3914). Both are excellent guides to the spirit of a people (XXIV. 30). 
And since the truly eloquent man must also be a lover of poetry (XX. 562), it is not surpris-
ing that in certain genres of eloquence, especially the funeral oration, the elevated style of 
eloquence borrows heavily from poetic diction (XVII. 374; cf. XVIII. 517). 
Yet in the final analysis, Voltaire saw poetry and eloquence as distinct. The ambiguity 
arises from the fact that both arts share many components, including thought and the use 
of arresting stylistic features. Both engage the emotions, intellect, and imagination. Both 
please as well as instruct. But because each art has its own goal, these elements are com-
bined differently. Voltaire’s description of the poet’s objective—“attacher l’esprit en flat-
tant l’imagination et l’oreille” (XXV. 202) points to two factors which separate poetry from 
eloquence : the imagination and musical qualities. Indeed, his belief that the poet has a 
special duty to please the ear was behind his lifelong defence of verse in poetry. A poem 
has a harmony prose lacks: “La bonne poésie est à la bonne prose ce que la danse est à une 
simple démarche noble, ce que la musique est au récit ordinaire” (XIV. 106). Likewise, the 
imagination plays a more dominant role in poetry than in eloquence : “le poëte a pour base 
de son ouvrage la fiction: aussi l’imagination est l’essence de son art; elle n’est que l’acces-
soire dans l’orateur” (XIX. 433). 
These differing goals are contrasted in Voltaire’s discussion of the role of elegance in 
the two arts for the Encyclopédie. Stylistic polish alone is not enough to make a speech good 
since persuasion is its aim. “Un discours peut être élégant sans être un hon discours, l’élé-
gance n’étant en effet que le mérite des paroles; mais un discours ne peut être absolument 
bon sans être élégant . . . Un orateur peut convaincre, émouvoir même sans élégance, sans 
pureté, sans nombre: un poëme ne peut faire d’effet s’il n’est élégant” (XVIII. 510). A poem 
cannot succeed without stylistic merit, but style is subordinate to persuasion in eloquence 
since a speech can both convince and move without it. Immediate effectiveness is the first 
measure of the success of a work of eloquence; elegance is only necessary if it is to achieve 
literary immortality. 
Poetry and eloquence are thus for Voltaire overlapping arts, with common components, 
but differing aims. In 1738 Voltaire gave Frederick perhaps his most balanced definition of 
eloquence: “cette auguste science / D’embellir la raison, de forcer les esprits” (Best. D1331). 
The second part of this definition, “forcer les esprits,” underlines eloquence’s goal. When 
poetry adorns the truth, it is primarily to please, for it is the music of the soul (XX. 232). 
Eloquence adorns the truth the better to persuade because eloquence is ultimately for Vol-
taire the “passe-porte” of reason (Best. D16390). 
Why, one might ask, does reason need a passport? To be sure, reason is the key factor 
in persuasion in Voltaire’s eyes. He called “les idées vraies et profondes” the hidden source 
of eloquence (Best. D15418). He insisted that “la dialectique est le fondement de l’art de 
persuader . . . être éloquent c’est savoir prouver” (XVIII. 515). It was because of the im-
portance of reason in eloquence that he wrote to his old rhetoric mentor Father Porée in 
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1738 that the study of true eloquence leads naturally to the study of philosophy (Best. 
D1660). 
Voltaire’s views on truth and probability allow us to assess the scope of eloquence in 
his eyes. For Voltaire, whose Philosophe ignorant (1766) sums up his lifelong awareness of 
the limits of human intelligence, absolute certainty is impossible to achieve in many cases. 
The article “Foi II” of the Questions sur l’Encyclopédie outlines three ways by which a prop-
osition can be called true. “Rien ne peut paraître vrai que par l’une de ces trois manières, 
ou par l’intuition, le sentiment: j’ existe, je vois le soleil; ou par des probabilités accumulées 
qui tiennent lieu de certitude: il y a une ville nommée Constantinople; ou par la voie de dé-
monstration: les triangles ayant même base et même hauteur sont égaux” (XIX. 157).10 The first 
and third methods can be said to bypass persuasion and result in an evidence—that is, a 
proposition which cannot be contested once it is understood. Intuition involves a direct 
perception of a self-evident truth; a proof in geometry requires a more complicated expo-
sition but produces a similar result. On the other hand, the second, the realm of the prob-
able, has traditionally belonged to rhetoric, and Voltaire was aware that eloquence was 
usually reserved for just such cases where the truth is not evident. Writing, for instance, to 
Richelieu in 1775 about one of the duke’s lawsuits, he remarked that “heureusement les 
preuves sont si fortes, qu’elles n’ont besoin d’aucune éloquence” (Best. D19342). In the 
Plaidoyer de Ramponeau (1760) the adage “là où la raison est évidente l’éloquence est inutile” 
is cited (XXIV. 118). 
The range of topics he assigned to the realm of the probable, and thus where eloquence 
could be used effectively, is wide. At various times he included metaphysics, law, history, 
and even medicine.11 These topics cover the major areas in which he displayed his enlight-
ened eloquence. For example there is his defence of deism in the Homélies prononcées à Lon-
dres (1767), or the pleas to redress judicial error such as the Avis au public sur les parricides 
imputés aux Calas et aux Sirven (1766). The biblical criticism in the Sermon des cinquante (1749) 
makes use of historical principles, and on a more minor note, there is even his advocacy of 
vaccination against smallpox in the Eloge funèbre de Louis XV (1774). Of course, the fact that 
eloquence deals most often in probabilities does not reduce the usefulness of reason ; rather 
reason is the indispensable tool for establishing the degree of probability men must be 
satisfied with where absolute certitude cannot be reached. Thus it is not unusual to find 
Voltaire arguing from probability, not only in works dealing with historical or legal evi-
dence, but even in ones dealing with metaphysical questions such as the existence of God. 
Voltaire emphasizes this distinction between mathematical certainty and probable truth 
in his discussion for the Encyclopédie of eloquence’s power to compel assent, force, which is 
perhaps the most distinctive feature of eloquent style in his eyes. First he noted that force 
is not a factor in mathematical proof where the conclusion is inevitable. It does, however, 
play a role in argumentation over questions dealing with probabilities. In the realm of the 
problematic, special attention must be paid to the choice and arrangement of proofs, choos-
ing ones that appeal to the audience at hand and arranging them to their best advantage 
(XIX. 172–173). In eloquence the force of the rational proofs is intensified by the addition of 
striking images and figures of speech; force here is presented as a skeleton of argumentation 
amplified by stylistic devices: “La force d’éloquence n’est pas seulement une suite de rai-
sonnements justes et vigoureux, qui subsisteraient avec la sécheresse; cette force demande 
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de l’embonpoint, des images frappantes, des termes énergiques” (XIX. 173). It is this force 
that makes eloquence the passport of reason. It allows eloquence, even when dealing with 
the probable, to create an assurance which can rival the immediacy of intuition or the cer-
tainty of mathematics. 
In poetry force is an incidental factor, while in philosophy rational proof alone should 
suffice. Eloquence has a third component, in addition to the impact of the argumentation 
and style. It appeals to the heart as well as to the head. Voltaire often stressed this emo-
tional element when praising effective eloquence. He wrote to the author of a legal brief 
on behalf of the Calas family, “il me paraît impossible que vôtre mémoire ne porte pas la 
conviction dans les esprits des juges et l’attendrissement dans les coeurs” (Best. D12421). 
Of one in his own favor he declared, “Il doit toucher et convaincre” (Best. D1761). It is not 
surprising that Voltaire never questioned the legitimacy of the emotions as a means of 
persuasion given his analysis of them in the Traité de métaphysique. Unlike animals, men 
have a natural instinct of pity and bienveillance toward their fellows which disposes them 
to come to each other’s aid, unless self-interest interferes. By making strong appeals to this 
innate compassion, eloquence can increase the likelihood that men will respond to their 
fellows’ plight rather than to self-interest. Thus at various times Voltaire recommended the 
whole range of emotions that appealed to the eighteenth-century sensibility from the ten-
der, tearful sentiments all the way to horror and indignation. To be sure, Voltaire’s empha-
sis on the heart in persuasion is not in contradiction with the spirit of enlightenment.12 He 
saw the emotions and the passions as complements of reason, as necessary and useful com-
ponents of human nature which an eloquence aiming at practical reform could not afford 
to ignore. Their function is to incite man to action, for man “est pourvu de passions pour 
agir, et de raison pour gouverner ses actions” (XXII. 30). 
This acceptance of emotional proofs is in direct contrast to the distrust of the emotions 
shown by seventeenth-century philosophers like Malebranche, who called them a major 
source of error.13 However, Voltaire did follow the Oratorian on a related issue : the conta-
gious power of the imagination. But while Malebranche worried about the imagination’s 
contribution to the success of heretical preachers, Voltaire pictured it as a cause of fanati-
cism among the ignorant. He noted that the force of eloquence, in its most vigorous form, 
produces an enthusiasm the speaker communicates to his listeners: “Tout est pour lui objet 
de comparaison rapide et de métaphore: sans qu’il y prenne garde, il anime tout, et fait 
passer dans ceux qui l’ecoutent une partie de son enthousiasme” (XVIII. 514). The pinnacle 
of art for a poet or orator is to combine enthusiasm with reason, but unfortunately, this 
“enthousiasme raisonnable” is extremely rare (XVIII. 554). More often enthusiasm side-
steps reason, appealing to the imagination, or more precisely to a faculty Voltaire, follow-
ing Malebranche, called the passive imagination. “Cette faculté passive, indépendante de 
la réflexion, est la source de nos passions et de nos erreurs. . . . Cette espèce d’imagination 
servile, partage ordinaire du peuple ignorant, a été l’instrument dont l’imagination forte 
de certains hommes s’est servie pour dominer” (XIX. 430). The common people are partic-
ularly susceptible to this manipulation. Animated with the enthusiasm aroused by the el-
oquence of their leaders, they become fanatics ready to sacrifice themselves for their cause 
like the followers of George Fox, or worse, to spread their gospel with the sword like the 
disciples of Mahomet. 
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Voltaire preferred for his own eloquence a simpler, less elevated style than the charis-
matic one that swept away the converts of a Fox or a Mahomet. It is a style, free of the 
excesses of enthusiasm, that he felt was more appropriate for the audience he had in mind, 
composed of members of the privileged classes. He conceived of his philosophic propa-
ganda as a kind of sermon addressed not to the priest-ridden masses but to the influential 
elite of France and the rest of Europe: “On ne peut pas assembler les hommes dans la plaine 
de Grenelle pour leur prêcher la raison; mais on éclaire par des livres de plus d’un genre 
les jeunes gens qui sont dignes d’être éclairés, et la lumière se propage d’un bout de l’Eu-
rope à l’autre. . . . J’entends les honnêtes gens, car pour les convulsionnaires, les bedeaux 
de paroisse et les porte-dieu, il ne faut pas s’embarrasser d’eux” (Best. D15907). 
Robert Niklaus has summed up the thrust of the French Enlightenment in three points: 
“acceptance of nature, as opposed to asceticism; of reason, opposed to a naïve faith in su-
perstition; and of tolerance opposed to religious persecution.”14 Perhaps no philosophe il-
lustrates this stance better than Voltaire, and enlightened eloquence as he conceived it 
provided an effective instrument for promoting these goals. His frank acceptance of the 
emotions as means of persuasion is indicative of his balanced view of human nature. He 
used reason both to attack prejudice and to defend the principles of natural religion. Even 
his battle for religious toleration was influenced by the rhetorical tradition. One of his fa-
vorite arguments for tolerance makes use of the rhetorical commonplace that persuasion 
is superior to violence: a religion, he maintained, should establish itself by the power of its 
truth, not by the power of force (XXVI. 113–114). 
Eloquence was situated in Voltaire’s eyes somewhere between two of his most cher-
ished preoccupations, poetry and philosophy. He saw it not as embellishment but as the 
art of persuasion, a necessary art in a world in which many questions could be settled only 
in terms of probabilities. Eloquence at its best employs a triple attack: “plaire, convaincre 
et toucher à la fois” (XVIII. 515) is its method. That is, it combines rational proof and ap-
peals to the emotions with the pleasure of fine style. Voltaire was undoubtedly attracted 
to this power, this force, that both poetry and philosophy lacked. Eloquence, which could 
be aimed at the head and the heart, suited his own artistic temperament as well as that of 
the public he hoped to reach. Thus, while Diderot abandoned oratorical forms in favor of 
dialogue to treat philosophical questions, Voltaire was quick to adapt many of the stand-
ard rhetorical genres to his use.15 He placed a description of his ideal of this enlightened 
eloquence in the mouth of philosophy herself in an allegorical passage of L’Homme aux 
quarante écus (1768): “La philosophie est enfin venue, elle a dit: ‘Ne parlez en public que 
pour dire des vérités neuves et utiles, avec l’éloquence du sentiment et de la raison’” (XXI. 
351). 
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